# security

Anthropic explains how claude.ai, Claude Code, and Claude Cowork contain agents: model defenses miss, permission prompts create fatigue, and the hard boundary is the VM, sandbox, filesystem policy, and egress control.

After analyzing the leaked Claude Code source, SemiAnalysis dropped a bombshell: TypeScript is no longer a language humans write — it is a language AI produces, consumes, and evolves. From a three-layer memory architecture to the autonomous agent mode KAIROS, from security holes to the new role of static types, this post breaks down what 600,000 leaked lines actually reveal.

Being a GenAI App Engineer increasingly feels like being a Permission Engineer. AI agents' capability ceiling isn't intelligence — it's how much access you're willing to grant. Every additional permission amplifies both power and risk. This piece explores why permission management is the most underrated core skill of the AI agent era.

Your AI Agent is very obedient — but it might be obeying the wrong person. Prompt Injection is social engineering for AI. Tool Use Exploitation is giving a Swiss Army knife to a 5-year-old. Context Poisoning is someone secretly changing books in a library. And then there's the zoo escape.

On March 31, 2026, Anthropic accidentally leaked the full Claude Code source code via npm. Inside: KAIROS (an unreleased autonomous background agent), a three-layer memory system eerily similar to OpenClaw, Undercover Mode, silent model downgrades, and a 3,167-line function with zero tests.

Popular AI library LiteLLM was hit with a malicious backdoor — just installing it could trigger credential theft of SSH keys, cloud tokens, and crypto wallets.

LiteLLM hit by supply chain attack — pip install was enough to steal all credentials. Karpathy warns about dependency tree risks and advocates using LLMs to yoink functionality instead of adding more deps.

Codex CLI is built with Rust, open-sourced under Apache 2.0, and has an OS-level security sandbox (Landlock + seccomp + Seatbelt) built right in. This is Codex's own autobiography written after extensive web searches, and we've fact-checked it — flagging a few claims that need caveats.

Gemini CLI's 1M token big eater context, built-in Web Search grounding, free and open-source. Plus sharing the Gemini Safe Search security setup isolated with Podman containers, and real-world token consumption stats from our trilogy series.

Karpathy's post is a reality check for the Claw era. He frames Claws as the next layer above LLM agents, but warns that exposed instances, RCE, supply-chain poisoning, and malicious skills can turn productivity systems into liabilities. His direction: small core, container-by-default, auditable skills.

Breaking down how OpenClaw connects to Telegram, Discord, and more — plus how AI executes commands, drives a browser, and stays safely leashed. A Python-friendly tour of a TypeScript architecture.

Someone fed 20+ OpenClaw articles to Opus 4.6 and asked it to write a complete setup guide. We fact-checked every command against a real environment.

1Password's security team found that the most downloaded skill on ClawHub was actually a malware delivery vehicle. Worse: it wasn't an isolated case — hundreds of skills were part of the same campaign. When markdown becomes an installer, skill registries become supply chain attack surfaces.

Crypto guy Jordan Lyall spent a week researching security before installing OpenClaw — this is the security guide he wished existed, written for people who don't want to become the next victim

Part 2 of the series: From SOUL file design to real disaster stories — TARS going dark for 3 days while traveling, context overflow crashes, rate limit surprises. Plus emergency procedures: what to do if your agent gets compromised.

Deno's hosted sandbox swaps your real API keys with placeholders inside the sandbox, only revealing the real keys at the proxy layer

Private data × Untrusted content × External communication = Perfect security disaster, and it's already happening everywhere

Everyone's installing OpenClaw raw and wondering why it burned $200 organizing Downloads. This guide adds guardrails: Raspberry Pi isolation, Tailscale VPN, Matrix E2E encryption, prompt injection hardening. The goal isn't perfect security—it's knowing where the bullets can get in.